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Abstract
Seminal papers on asymmetric information in competitive insurance markets,
analysing the monetary deductible as a screening device, show that any existing
equilibrium is of a separating type. High risks buy complete insurance whilst low
risks buy partial insurance  and this result holds for Nash behaviour as well as
for Wilson foresight. In this paper, we analyze the strength of screening based on
limitations to the period of coverage of the contract. We show that in this case a)
the Nash equilibrium may entail low risks purchasing any insurance at all and b)
under Wilson foresight, a pooling equilibrium may exist.
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1 Introduction
In insurance markets with adverse selection and two di¤erent risk types, insurers can
implement a screening tool to separate low risk and high risk individuals. The most com-
mon device is the monetary deductible. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that,
if this instrument is applied in a competitive market with Nash behavior, an equilibrium
exists if the proportion of high risks in a population exceeds a certain threshold. This
equilibrium, in the sequel called a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, is always of a separating
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type. High risks buy full coverage and low risks buy partial coverage, both at actuarially
fair terms. Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) demonstrate that, in a competitive market
with Wilson foresight1, an equilibrium always exists. Like the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
derived in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), such an equilibrium is always of a separating
type, except that high risks may be subsidized by low risks. Crocker and Snow (1985)
show that, according to the denition of e¢ciency developed in Harris and Townsend
(1981), such a Wilson-Miyazaki equilibrium is second best e¢cient.
An alternative screening device, which will be the topic of this paper, a time deductible
may be considered. Such a device excludes coverage for events that occur during a pre-
dened period after the inception of the policy. The method, possibly aiming to rule
out preexisting conditions, has found applications in some dental and medical policies.
Besides, over recent years it has gained popularity among Dutch group life companies, as
a consequence of new legislation concerning the medical examination of employees. By
the new law which came into force at the beginning of 1998, insurance companies are
strongly restricted in their possibilities to perform medical tests on individual members of
a group life scheme. A time deductible may then be an appropriate instrument to identify
individuals who are likely to make a claim soon after inception.
In the previous literature, the main focus has been on the probationary period, which
is a special case of a time deductible, where the coverage of the contract starts at a
certain date after the inception of the policy. Several characteristics of the probationary
period, like for example its implication for the expected utility of consumers, have been
investigated in Eeckhoudt et al. (1988). The authors main conclusion is that most
of the basic properties of the above mentioned monetary deductibles do not carry over
to probationary periods. For example, the equilibrium on a competitive market (with
1Wilson foresight (see Wilson, 1977) implies that the insurance companies take into account that
existing contracts may be withdrawn as a result of a new contract under consideration.
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symmetric information regarding risk class) is completely ambiguous when there is a
positive loading factor - as opposed to the monetary deductible case where the optimal
solution involves incomplete yet positive coverage. The intuition behind this result is
that with a probationary period, it is not possible to rank di¤erent degrees of coverage
according to their riskiness (in the sense of Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970). Hence, preferences
will typically exhibit non-convexities with regard to premium rates and the period of
probation.
Fluet (1992) applies the concept of a probationary period in a competitive insurance
market with asymmetric information and rms exhibiting Nash behavior. He adopts the
screening device of a time-dependent monetary deductible. Assuming that the proportion
of high risk agents is large enough, the high risks buy full coverage, while the low risks
buy partial coverage in monetary terms. The monetary deductible may vary over time
but is always positive. Hence, the contract with a pure probationary period can never
be an equilibrium, but a combination of an initial probationary period and subsequent
monetary deductibles may well arise.
Fluets nding suggests a certain kind of inferiority of the probationary period as a
screening device, when compared with the monetary deductible. This has been conrmed
in Spreeuw (2005), who shows that using this instrument in a monopolistic insurance
market may lead to a pooling equilibrium, where both classes of risk buy full coverage.
This would never be possible with a monetary deductible, as shown in Stiglitz (1977).
This paper deals with a competitive insurance market and focuses on the general
properties of a time deductible, rather than the monetary deductible, as an instrument
to make individuals self-select. In this respect, the approach is less general than Fluet
(1992) as contracts incorporating both time and monetary deductibles are not considered.
It should be noted, however, that a monetary deductible always implies some non-linear
pricing which may be di¢cult to implement in practice. Moreover, Fluet (1992) has
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shown that the combination of both devices makes it di¢cult to draw conclusions, unless
restricting assumptions are being made. By concentrating on the time deductible, one can
get an idea of possible equilibria resulting if, just as in Fluet (1992), allowance is made
for partial coverage in monetary terms. We will, however, deal with both the cases of
Nash behavior and Wilson foresight. We will show that, in the former case, a separating
equilibrium may be degenerate if the risk of accident is high, and in the latter case a
pooling equilibrium may exist.
The model is described in Section 2, where also the basic assumptions are listed. In
Section 3, it is assumed that rms are myopic in the sense that they do not take subsequent
withdrawals of contracts into account when designing policies. We show that if the low
risks probability of incurring a loss is high and the distinction between the high risks and
low risks is strong, the separating equilibrium will be degenerate in the sense that the low
risk type gets no insurance coverage at all. Such an equilibrium exists provided that the
share of high risks in the population is su¢ciently high.
Section 4 deals with Wilson foresight. There we show that, if the insurers strategy
is restricted to pooling contracts, full coverage may constitute an equilibrium. This is a
result which contradicts Miyazakis and Spences ndings. Finally, we drop the restriction
to pooling contracts and allow the insurer to o¤er any pair of policies. It is shown that
even then a pooling contract may constitute an equilibrium. Under the assumptions
stated in this paper, such a pooling contract would involve complete coverage.
Conclusions are given in Section 5.
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2 The basic assumptions and the nature of a time
deductible
The basic assumptions are mainly derived from Fluet (1992). For the ease of exposition
they are listed below:
 A population consists of two risk classes, namely the high risks and the low risks. In
the remainder of this paper all variables pertaining to high risk and low risk individ-
uals will be accompanied by the subscripts H and L, respectively. All individuals
have an initial wealth equal to W .
 All individuals within the population are identical, except with respect to the prob-
ability of having an accident in the period [0; n], where 0 is the current time. In case
an individual is faced with an accident, there is a monetary loss D. The probability
of having an accident for an individual of risk class i is denoted by i; i 2 fH;Lg,
with L < H < 1. It is assumed that an accident can occur to each individual at
most once.
 All risks are insurable.
 The population consists ofN individuals, of whichNH andNL belong to the category
of high risks and low risks respectively. Hence N = NH + NL. The proportion of
high risks among the entire population is denoted by , so NH = N .
 The time at which any accident occurs is perfectly observable by both the individual
concerned and the company, and veriable.
 The probability for an individual of risk class i, i 2 fH;Lg, of facing an accident
before time t (0  t  n) is denoted by Fi(t) (hence Fi(n) = i), and it is assumed
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to be di¤erentiable in [0; n], with derivative fi(t) > 0; 8t 2 [0; n]. All individuals
fully know these probabilities. These probabilities are exogenous, so that the risk
of moral hazard is non-existent.
 The di¤erence between the probability density functions fH(t) and fL(t) is deter-
mined by b (t):
fH (t) = b (t) fL (t) ; with b (t) > 0; 0  t  n (1)
where b (t) is a real valued and di¤erentiable function.2
 To each individual, the same utility function U() applies, which is assumed to be
increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable and independent of
time.
 Insurance companies are risk neutral prot maximizers and can o¤er any set of
contracts which result in a nonnegative expected prot.
 There are no transaction costs involved in the supply of insurance and no administra-
tive costs for the insurance business. Nor are there costs of obtaining classication
information on a potential insured when it is possible to do so.
 Contracts are specied by (t1; t2; P ), with t1 denoting the date at which the insurance
coverage starts (i.e., the end of the probationary period) and t2 is the end of the
coverage period; hence, it is assumed that the screening mechanism is restricted to
time deductibles concentrated at the beginning and/or at the end of the contract.
P denotes the premium of a contract, payable irrespective of whether and when the
2It should be noted that, apart from the assumption L < H < 1 made above, this is the only
restriction we put on the loss distributions. Hence, we do not impose the additional condition fH
1 FH
>
fL
1 FL
8t which is necessary for some of Fluets (1992) results.
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accident occurs. Thus, for the given contract, no indemnity is paid if an accident
occurs outside the period (t1; t2], nor will the premium P , to be paid at time 0, be
refunded to the insured. On the other hand, if an accident occurs during the period
(t1; t2], the insured will get a benet equal to D (= loss).
 We denote the expected utility resulting from taking out the policy (t1; t2; P ) by
Ei (t1; t2; P ). This implies:
Ei (t1; t2; P ) = (i   Fi (t2) + Fi (t1))U (W   P  D)
+ (1  i + Fi (t2)  Fi (t1))U (W   P ) ; i 2 fH;Lg :
The special case of no insurance is denoted by Ei, so:
Ei = Ei (t; t; 0) = iU (W  D) + (1  i)U (W ) ; i 2 fH;Lg ; t 2 [0; n] : (2)
3 The Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we work with the assumption that insurance companies are myopic in the
sense that they do not take potential withdrawals of competitors contracts into account
when o¤ering policies. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that, if all rms in
the insurance market are myopic and the proportion of high risks exceeds a certain level,
a Cournot-Nash separating equilibrium exists. High risks buy full insurance while the
policy for the low risks is subject to a monetary deductible.
We will show that a combination of time deductibles at the beginning and towards the
end of the duration of the contract, will only occur under some special conditions. We also
argue that the conditions for a probationary period to be preferred over a limited term,
are fairly simple and intuitive. We then proceed to show that, with the time deductible
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as a screening device, a separating Cournot-Nash equilibrium may involve having low
risks purchasing no insurance at all. Such an equilibrium would involve the contract
(0; n; HD) for the high risks (i.e. full coverage, at an actuarially fair premium), in
combination with a certain contract (t1; t

2; (FL (t

2)  FL (t

1))D) (partial coverage at an
actuarially fair premium) for the low risks. It exists if the proportion of bad risks exceeds
a certain level.
3.1 The degenerate equilibrium
First we dene our equilibrium concept.
Denition 1 A Nash Equilibrium is a set of contracts
 
tH1 ; t
H
2 ; PH

and
 
tL1 ; t
L
2 ; PL

that
maximizes expected welfare Ei (t1; t2; P ) of each risk type, subject to the following con-
straints:
EH
 
tH1 ; t
H
2 ; PH

  EH
 
tL1 ; t
L
2 ; PL

 0 (ICH)
EL
 
tL1 ; t
L
2 ; PL

  EL
 
tH1 ; t
H
2 ; PH

 0 (ICL)
 
FL
 
ti2

  FL
 
ti1

D   Pi  0; i = L;H (BE)
ti1  0; i = L;H (TC1)
ti2  n; i = L;H (TC2)
ti1  t
i
2; i = L;H (TC3)
Hence, the equilibrium concept requires that expected utility is maximized for both
types (since otherwise another contract could attract consumers and make non-negative
prots) given the incentive compatibility constraints (ICH) and (ICL); the zero-prot
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constraint (BE); the requirement that the probationary period is non-negative and less
than n (TC1); the requirement that the limited term t2 commences at a positive date
which is less than n (TC2); and that short-selling of insurance coverage is not allowed
(TC3). The following Lemma suggests that some combinations of contracts can be ruled
out immediately.
Lemma 1 Amongst actuarially fair contracts according to (BE), the full coverage con-
tract (0; n; iD) provides the consumer with the highest expected utility.
Proof. An individual with utility function U () is risk averse if and only if for any
p 2 [0; 1]
pU (W   (Fi (t2)  Fi (t1))D  D)+(1  p)U (W   (Fi (t2)  Fi (t1))D) < U (W   (Fi (t2)  Fi (t1))D   pD
(3)
Replacing p = i   Fi (t2) + Fi (t1) in (3) leads to the LHS being equivalent to expected
utility from any actuarially fair contract, and the RHS is the utility from the contract with
full coverage, (0; n; iD).
An implication of Lemma 1 is that the low risk type never gets full coverage in a
separating equilibrium, since such a contract would be purchased by the high risk type
as well. Hence, the equilibrium contract for L will entail either a probationary period, or
a limited term, or both. We now proceed to identify conditions for when these di¤erent
types of contracts emerge in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If the low risk type purchases insurance, the following conclusions can be
drawn about equilibrium contracts:
(i) a combination of probationary period and limited term can occur in equilibrium
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only if there exist at least two dates t; t0 for which
fH (t)
fL (t)
=
fH (t
0)
fL (t0)
(4)
(ii) if the ratio fH(t)
fL(t)
is strictly monotone decreasing for all t 2 [0; n], then the contract
cannot entail a limited term
(iii) if the ratio fH(t)
fL(t)
is strictly monotone increasing for all t 2 [0; n], then the contract
cannot entail a probationary period
(iv) if the ratio fH(t)
fL(t)
is constant for all t 2 [0; n], then the existence of an equilib-
rium with partial coverage for the low risk type implies the existence of a continuum of
equilibrium contracts.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 above that the high risk type will be provided with
full coverage in equilibrium. Hence, we can derive the conditions for the equilibrium
contract by maximising EL
 
tL1 ; t
L
2 ; PL

with respect to all the constraints from Denition
1. Denoting the equilibrium contract o¤ered to the low risk type by (t1; t

2; P

L) and
Lagrange multipliers by i (where the index i corresponds to the various constraints in
the denition; i.e. ICH is the Lagrange multiplier for type Hs incentive compatibility
constraint), we have the following:
(i) If there is a combination of probationary period and limited term (i.e. 0 < t1 <
t2 < n) then the following necessary conditions apply:
@L
@t1

t1=t1
= fL (t

1)

BED  

1 + ICL   ICH
fH (t

1)
fL (t1)

(U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))

= 0
@L
@t2

t2=t2
=  fL (t

2)

BED  

1 + ICL   ICH
fH (t

2)
fL (t2)

(U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))

= 0
Since the two conditions are identical, t1 6= t

2 requires that the condition (4) is satised.
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(ii) Consider an equilibrium contract with limited term such that 0  t1 < t

2 < n.
Then the following rst order conditions apply
@L
@t1

t1=t1
= fL (t

1)

BED  

1 + ICL   ICH
fH (t

1)
fL (t1)

(U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))

+TC1 = 0
@L
@t2

t2=t2
=  fL (t

2)

BED  

1 + ICL   ICH
fH (t

2)
fL (t2)

(U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))

= 0:
Solving the second FOC for BE and rearranging, we get
@L
@t1

t1=t1
=  fL (t

1)ICH

fH (t

2)
fL (t2)
 
fH (t

1)
fL (t1)

(U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))+TC1 = 0:
Since TC1  0, the condition requires that
fH(t2)
fL(t2)
 
fH(t1)
fL(t1)
 0, i.e. that the ratio is
not strictly monotone decreasing in t.
(iii) Consider an equilibrium contract with probationary period such that 0 < t1 <
t2  n. Then the following rst order conditions apply
@L
@t1

t1=t1
= fL (t

1)

BED  

1 + ICL   ICH
fH (t

1)
fL (t1)

(U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))

= 0
@L
@t2

t2=t2
=  fL (t

2)

BED  

1 + ICL   ICH
fH (t

2)
fL (t2)

(U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))

 TC2 = 0:
Solving the rst FOC for BE and rearranging, we get
@L
@t2

t2=t2
= fL (t

2)ICH

fH (t

1)
fL (t1)
 
fH (t

2)
fL (t2)

(U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D)) TC2 = 0
Since TC2  0, this requires that
fH(t1)
fL(t1)
 
fH(t2)
fL(t2)
 0, i.e. that the ratio is not strictly
monotone increasing in t.
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(iv) Suppose we denote the constant ratio by . Then we can write the rst order
conditions as
@L
@t1

t1=t1
= fL (t

1) fBED   (1 + ICL   ICH) (U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))g+TC1 = 0
@L
@t2

t2=t2
=  fL (t

2) fBED   (1 + ICL   ICH) (U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))g TC2 = 0:
We know that the constraints TC1 and TC2 cannot both be binding, as that would
imply full coverage for the low risk type. Similarly, since fL () is strictly positive, the
FOCs imply that TC1 = TC2, thus ruling out a situation where only one of them
is binding as well. On the other hand, the break-even constraint needs to be binding in
equilibrium. Otherwise, the two conditions above would imply that (1 + ICL   ICH) =
0; however, this would contradict @L
@PL

PL=P

L
= 0. Thus, we have BE > 0 and it follows
that P L = (FL (t

2)  FL (t

1))D. Hence, for a given solution P

L, it follows that if the
contract (t1; t

2) constitutes an equilibrium, then any other contract (t
0
1; t
0
2) such that
FL (t
0
2)   FL (t
0
1) = FL (t

2)   FL (t

1) will be an equilibrium as well. Observe further that
the second derivatives of L are equal to zero at (t1; t

2), conrming the existence of a range
of equilibria.
These results all have straightforward interpretations. They are all related to where
the low risk type have their probability of accident concentrated compared with the high
risk type. The rst result, (i), states that the two types of screening mechanism can only
occur together if the ratio between the two risk densities is not monotonically increasing or
decreasing throughout. Parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition state the interesting result
that a pure probationary period will be chosen whenever the relative risk ratio between
high and low is monotonically decreasing and that a pure limited term will be used in
the opposite case. This result is fairly intuitive. In most situations, the choice between
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probationary period and limited term depends entirely on the incentive compatibility
problem of the high risk type. When the high risk type has most of their risk concentrated
after the beginning of the contract, the low risk type will have to give up relatively little
insurance coverage to convince the insurer that they belong to the low risk type; and
the opposite holds for situations where the ratio is monotonically increasing. Case (iv),
nally, highlights the fact that the timing of the event carries no information of risk type
in the case when the ratio between the two probability density functions is constant  and
hence time deductibles become less useful as screening devices in this case (cf. Milgrom,
1981).
Thus, Proposition 1 gives general conditions for when a probationary period will be
preferred over the limited term as a screening mechanism; and that the screening mecha-
nism that minimizes the loss to the low risk type will always be chosen. In what follows,
we will argue that time deductibles might nevertheless be poor screening mechanisms, by
showing that the contract o¤ered to the low risk type might be so poor that they actually
prefer to purchase no insurance all in equilibrium. We restrict ourselves to pure proba-
tionary periods and pure limited terms; hence, it is assumed in the following that the ratio
fH(t)
fL(t)
is strictly monotonically increasing or decreasing throughout. Since we have H > L,
it should be noted that this assumption means that a) in the case of fH(t)
fL(t)
monotonically
decreasing, FH (t) > FL (t) for all t 2 [0; n], which means that, given the absence of a
limited term, the incentive compatibility constraint for the low risks is always satised,
and b) in the case of fH(t)
fL(t)
monotonically increasing we have H   FH (t) > L   FL (t)
for all t 2 [0; n], which means that, given the absence of a probationary period, again the
incentive compatibility constraint for the low risks is always satised. So in both cases,
we would have ICL = 0.
Conditions for non-purchase of low in equilibrium are provided in the next proposition.
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Proposition 2 Whenever the ratio fH(t)
fL(t)
is monotonically increasing or decreasing through-
out [0; n], the following result holds:
(i) For su¢ciently high L and H , the separating equilibrium will involve low risks
purchasing no insurance at all, whereas high risks purchase complete coverage.
(ii) Such an equilibrium exists if the share of high risk types is higher than ^, where
^ = max
t1
(1  FL (t1)) (U
0 (W   P  D)  U 0 (W   P ))
fH(t1)
fL(t1)
  1

(U 0 (W   P ) + FL (t1) (U 0 (W   P  D)  U 0 (W   P )))
Proof. (i) It follows from Proposition 1 that any contract o¤ered to the low risk type
will have either a pure probationary period or a pure limited term. Concerning the pure
probationary period, we need to establish conditions for t1 = n. First, consider the
expected utility of low with t2 = n and actuarially fair premiums:
EL (t1; n; PL) = FL (t1)U (W   (L   FL (t1))D  D)
+ (1  FL (t1))U (W   (L   FL (t1))D)
Taking the derivative with respect to t1 gives
dEL (t1; n; PL)
dt1
= fL (t1)D  fFL (t1)U
0 (W   PL  D) + (1  FL (t1))U
0 (W   PL)
 
U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D)
D

(5)
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which, according to the mean value theorem, is equal to
d
EL (t1; n; PL)
dt1
= fL (t1)D
 fFL (t1)U
0 (W   (L   FL (t1))D  D) + (1  FL (t1)U
0 (W   (L   FL (t1))D))
  U 0 (W   (L   FL (t1))D    (t1))g ; (6)
for some  (t1) 2 [0; D] : For t1 = n, equation (6) reduces to:

d
EL (t1; n; PL)
dt1

(t1=n)
= fL (n)D (LU
0 (W  D) + (1  L)U
0 (W )  U 0 (W    (n))) : (7)
For large L, this derivative is positive, indicating that in such cases the individual prefers
no insurance to coverage with a long probationary period. Hence, for tL in a neighborhood
of n, and a relatively smooth behavior of FL (tL), the derivative in (6) will be positive
as well. So there are at least some actuarially fair contracts which a low risk will not
purchase. Now consider inequality (ICH), which is binding in equilibrium. The greater
H , the higher the premium for the high risks and the longer the probationary period for
the low risks. Hence, for high values of H , the critical value of t1 will be at a point where
the derivative (6) is positive.
When instead a limited term is chosen, low will attain expected utility
EL (0; t2; PL) = (L   FL (t2))U (W   PL  D) + (1  L + FL (t2))U (W   PL) :
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Hence, the derivative with respect to t2, for an actuarially fair contract, is
dEL (0; t2; (FL (t2))D)
dt2
= fL (t2)D 

U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D)
D
  (L   FL (t2))U
0 (W   PL  D)  (1  L + FL (t2))U
0 (W   PL)g
(8)
and for t2 = 0, we get

dEL (0; t2; FL (t2)D)
dt2

t2=0
= fL (0)D  fU
0 (W   PL    (0))
  LU
0 (W   PL  D)  (1  L)U
0 (W   PL)g
which is negative for high values of L and thus (8) is also negative in a neighborhood of
0. Obviously, the reasoning from above concerning the conditions on H apply also in this
case.
(ii) Probationary period: Under the conditions stated, a su¢cient condition arises
if, for any t1, the slope of the iso-prot curve for pooling contracts
 
dPL
dt1
= (fH (t1) + (1  ) fL (t1))D
is at least as great as the marginal rate of substitution for the low risk type:
 
dPL
dt1
=
fL (t1) (U (W   PL)  U (W   PL  D))
FL (t1)U 0 (W   PL  D) + (1  FL (t1))U 0 (W   PL)
=
fL (t1)U
0 (W   PL    (t1))
FL (t1)U 0 (W   PL  D) + (1  FL (t1))U 0 (W   PL)
D
Now, given that U 0 (W   PL    (t1)) < U
0 (W   PL  D), this leads to the su¢cient
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condition
 >
(1  FL (t1)) (U
0 (W   P  D)  U 0 (W   P ))
fH(t1)
fL(t1)
  1

(U 0 (W   P ) + FL (t1) (U 0 (W   P  D)  U 0 (W   P )))
;
which makes sense as long as fH(t1)
fL(t1)
> 1.
Limited term: Exactly the same conditions for existence apply.
This result  that the low risk type might prefer not to purchase any insurance, might
not seem very surprising given the nding of Proposition 1, that the low risk type tends
to be o¤ered a probationary period when they are not particularly prone to su¤er an
accident at the beginning (and the converse goes for the limited term: it tends to be
o¤ered when they are not particularly prone to su¤er an accident at the end of the term).
However, the nding that no insurance becomes particularly attractive for high values
of L might require some further explanation. The e¤ect that seems to be driving this
result is the peculiarity of the marginal utility with respect to changes in the length of
the probationary period (equation (5)) or the limited term (equation (8)). This marginal
utility consists of one positive and one negative part. The positive part is related to the
reduction in the premium rate which the individual enjoys as a result of an increase in
the time deductible. There is also a negative e¤ect, reecting the reduction in utility due
to the fact that the individual now has less coverage. However, only the rst, positive
e¤ect is proportional to the overall length time deductible  and whenever this deductible
becomes long enough, the positive e¤ect of increasing the time deductible will dominate
to such an extent that the individual will decide to purchase no insurance. This is also
the reason why the same condition applies for the probationary period and the limited
term in the same way: both deductibles converge to L when the period of non-coverage
grows long.
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Concerning the conditions for existence, we nd that they are similar to the ndings
for the monetary deductible: that the proportion of high risks must be relatively high,
since otherwise the separating equilibrium can be challenged by a pooling contract.
4 Wilson foresight
If rms behave with Wilson foresight, an equilibrium, based on maximal welfare for the
low risks always exists. In this section, we show that such an equilibrium may be of a
pooling type.
4.1 Optimal pooling contract
Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) have shown that, for the monetary deductible as a
screening device the equilibrium is always of a separating type. From the insurers point
of view, a pooling strategy without full coverage will always be inferior to o¤ering a pair
of di¤erent contracts, with the original pooling contract designed for the low risks and
full coverage for the high risks.
Furthermore, a pooling strategy can never involve complete coverage. In case of pool-
ing, one of the risk types would pay a loaded premium. As discussed for example in
Arrow (1963) and Pashigian et al. (1966), full insurance cannot be optimal if a premium
is loaded. This point is also stressed in Eeckhoudt et al. (1988).
In this subsection, we will concentrate on the latter conclusion. We show that, using
time deductibles as screening device, the full coverage pooling contract might be the
pooling contract which provides the low risk type with the highest expected utility. In
the next subsection, we proceed to show that this contract might even be the equilibrium
contract.
Assume that the insurer can only o¤er a pooling contract (t1; t2; P ) : We denote the
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objective function by bVL (t1; t2; P ), which is dened as the expected utility for a low risk
type agent resulting from o¤ering such a contract. Then we have
bVL (t1; t2; P ) = (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U (W   P  D)+(1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U (W   P ) :
(9)
Such contracts satisfy the binding non-prot constraint:
P = ((1  ) (FL (t2)  FL (t1)) +  (FH (t2)  FH (t1)))D: (10)
So we can express P as a function of t1 and t2. We will use the notation P (t1; t2) and,
consequently, bVL (t1; t2) to denote bVL (t1; t2; P ) in (9) expressed as a function of t1 and t2
only:
bVL (t1; t2) = (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U (W   P (t1; t2) D)
+ (1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U (W   P (t1; t2)) : (11)
We analyze the function (11) by taking its derivatives with respect to t1 and t2. This
returns:
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dbVL (t1; t2)
dt1
=  fL (t1) (U (W   P (t1; t2))  U (W   P (t1; t2) D))
 
dP (t1; t2)
dt1
0B@ (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U 0 (W   P (t1; t2) D)
+ (1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U
0 (W   P (t1; t2))
1CA
= fL (t1)
8>>>><>>>>:

1 + 

fH(t1)
fL(t1)
  1

D
0B@ (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U 0 (W   P (t1; t2) D)
+ (1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U
0 (W   P (t1; t2))
1CA
  (U (W   P (t1; t2))  U (W   P (t1; t2) D))
9>>>>=>>>>;
(12)
In accordance with the mean value theorem:
U (W   P (t1; t2))  U (W   P (t1; t2) D)
D
= U 0 (W   P (t1; t2)   (t1; t2)) ; (13)
for some  (t1; t2) 2 [0; D] ; t1; t2 2 [0; n]. Note that, compared to the previous subsec-
tion, P is a function of t1 and t2 , so  is a function of t1 and t2 as well. Consequently:
U 0 (W   P (t1; t2) D)  U
0 (W   P (t1; t2)   (t1; t2))  U
0 (W   P (t1; t2)) : (14)
So we can rewrite (12) as
dbVL (t1; t2)
dt1
= fL (t1)D
8>>>><>>>>:

1 + 

fH(t1)
fL(t1)
  1
0B@
0B@ (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U 0 (W   P (t1; t2) D)
+ (1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U
0 (W   P (t1; t2))
1CA
1CA
 U 0 (W   P (t1; t2)   (t1; t2))
9>>>>=>>>>;
(15)
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For t1 = 0, expression (15) reduces to
 
dbVL (t1; t2)
dt1
!
(t1=0)
= fL (0)D
8>>>><>>>>:

1 + 

fH(0)
fL(0)
  1
0B@ (L   FL (t2))U 0 (W   P (0; t2) D)
+ (1  L + FL (t2))U
0 (W   P (0; t2))
1CA
 U 0 (W   P (0; t2)   (0; t2))
9>>>>=>>>>; :
(16)
For low values of L, this expression will be negative whenever  = 0 or
fH(0)
fL(0)
= 1;
irrespective of the value of t2. By continuity, it is therefore negative at t1 = 0 for  and
fH(0)
fL(0)
in a neighborhood of 0 and 1, respectively. This implies that, for such values of
 or fH(0)
fL(0)
, the pooling contract without a probationary period is at least not the worst
among all the pooling contracts. Recall that, for the monetary deductible as a screening
device, the above expression is always positive, so complete coverage can never constitute
an equilibrium.
Concerning the limited term t2, the corresponding derivative is:
dbVL (t1; t2)
dt2
= fL (t2) (U (W   P (t1; t2))  U (W   P (t1; t2) D))
 
dP (t1; t2)
dt2
0B@ (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U 0 (W   P (t1; t2) D)
+ (1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U
0 (W   P (t1; t2))
1CA
= fL (t2)
8>>>><>>>>:
(U (W   P (t1; t2))  U (W   P (t1; t2) D))
 

1 + 

fH(t2)
fL(t2)
  1

D
0B@ (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U 0 (W   P (t1; t2) D)
+ (1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U
0 (W   P (t1; t2))
1CA
9>>>>=>>>>;
(17)
For t2 = n, expression (17) reduces to
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dbVL (t1; t2)
dt2
!
(t2=n)
= fL (n)D
8>>>><>>>>:
U 0 (W   P (t1; n)   (t1; n))
 

1 + 

fH(n)
fL(n)
  1
0B@ FL (t1)U 0 (W   P (t1; n) D)
+ (1  FL (t1))U
0 (W   P (t1; n))
1CA
9>>>>=>>>>;
For low values of L, this expression will be positive whenever  = 0 or
fH(n)
fL(n)
= 1 
irrespective of the value of t1. By continuity, it is therefore negative at t2 = n for  and
fH(n)
fL(n)
in a neighborhood of 0 and 1, respectively. This implies that, for such values of 
or fH(n)
fL(n)
, the pooling contract without a limited term is at least not the worst among all
the pooling contracts.
Furthermore, note that if L is small, then FL (t) is small for each t 2 [0; n] and hence,
again by continuity, we have for each (t1; t2) such that 0  t1  t2  n:
U 0 (W   P (t1; t2)   (t1; t2))  (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U
0 (W   P (t) D)
+ (1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U
0 (W   P (t)) : (18)
This inequality implies that d
bVL(t1;t2)
dt1
is negative and d
bVL(t1;t2)
dt2
positive everywhere for
 and fH(t)
fL(t)
in a neighborhood of 0 and 1, respectively. It follows that the best pooling
strategy may be indeed to provide full coverage.
Of course, the insurers choice is not restricted to pooling contracts; the general case
where the insurer can o¤er any pair of policies, is dealt with in the next section.
4.2 The equilibrium
Obviously, the low risks opportunities for a higher welfare are enhanced if, unlike the
previous subsection, its choice is not restricted to pooling contracts. We now derive
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properties of Wilson equilibria. In this part, the analysis is considerably simplied by the
fact that a Nash equilibrium satises all the constraints of a Wilson equilibrium. Hence, it
follows that the Nash equilibrium  if it exists  will also be a Wilson equilibrium, unless a
Pareto improvement can be attained by letting the low risk type cross-subsidize the high
risk type. Cross-subsidization in the other direction will not take place in equilibrium
since the contract o¤ered to the high risk type in such a case would make non-negative
prots if o¤ered with an actuarially fair premium instead.
It follows that all gains due to the possibility of cross-subsidization will accrue to the
low risk type. The reason is that amongst two Pareto e¢cient separating contracts, the
low risk type will choose the contract which provides them with the highest utility, and
once they withdraw from the alternative contract, this contract will be making losses and
will have to be withdrawn. Hence, Miyazakis (1977) nding that if the Wilson equilibrium
deviates from the Nash equilibrium, the former behaves as if it would be maximising lows
utility  carries over to our case also.
Thus, we can use the following denition for a Wilson equilibrium.
Denition 2 The Wilson Equilibrium is a set of contracts
 
tH1 ; t
H
2 ; PH

and
 
tL1 ; t
L
2 ; PL

that maximizes lows expected welfare
EL
 
tL1 ; t
L
2 ; PL

subject to the following constraints:
EH
 
tH1 ; t
H
2 ; PH

  EH
 
tL1 ; t
L
2 ; PL

 0 (ICH)
EL
 
tL1 ; t
L
2 ; PL

  EL
 
tH1 ; t
H
2 ; PH

 0 (ICL)
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
  
FH
 
tH2

  FH
 
tH1

D   PH

+ (1  )
  
FL
 
tL2

  FL
 
tL1

D   PL

 0 (BE)
ti1 2 [0; n] ; i = L;H (TC1)
ti2 2 [0; n] ; i = L;H (TC2)
ti1  t
i
2; i = L;H (TC3)
The denition is similar to the Nash Equilibrium (Denition 1), with the main dif-
ference that cross-subsidization is allowed. It should be noted that the above constraints
allow for a pooling equilibrium, since tL1 = t
H
1 , t
L
2 = t
H
2 and PH = PL are possible.
Finally, we combine the setting of this subsection with ndings from the previous one,
and derive conditions under which a pooling equilibrium with full coverage is the Wilson
equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For low values of  and the ratio fH(t)
fL(t)
 1;8t 2 [0; 1] the Wilson equilib-
rium entails a pooling contract with full coverage.
Proof. We have already established that full coverage pooling is the best pooling
contract under these circumstances. For any premium PL which satises the constraints
of Denition 2 above, the contract will be a pooling contract whenever
U (W   (H + (1  ) L)D)  (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U (W   PL  D) (19)
+(1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U (W   PL)
We have established above that the Wilson equilibrium premium for low will always be
at least as high as the actuarially fair premium. Hence, a su¢cient condition for (19) to
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hold is
U (W   (H + (1  ) L)D)  (L   FL (t2) + FL (t1))U (W   (FL (t2)  FL (t1))D  D)
+ (1  L + FL (t2)  FL (t1))U (W   (FL (t2)  FL (t1))D) :
Whenever  = 0, this inequality holds strictly for any n > t2 > t1 > 0 if the low risk type
is risk averse (Lemma 1). It follows that it will also hold in a neighborhood of  = 0.
5 Conclusions and nal remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the e¤ectiveness of a time deductible as a screening
device in an insurance market with adverse selection problems. In general, we nd evi-
dence that the time deductible is a relatively poor instrument, and this nding seems to
be robust to varying assumptions on the extent of forward-looking behavior on the part
of the insurance companies.
Accordingly, we nd that the Cournot-Nash separating equilibrium, if it exists, may
entail no insurance coverage at all for the low risks. This outcome is quite di¤erent
from the equilibrium derived in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), where low risks always
get some degree of coverage. This degenerate equilibrium comes about if the low risks
probability of incurring an accident is large, and the di¤erence between low and high risks
in the incidence of accidents changes monotonically over time. The general conditions for
existence of an equilibrium are quite similar to those found by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), i.e. that the proportion of high risks in the population is su¢ciently high.
Moreover we nd that, in contradiction to the ndings in Miyazaki (1977) and Spence
(1978), a pooling contract with complete coverage may provide the low risks more welfare
than any other pooling contract. O¤ering such a contract may even be more benecial to
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this class of risk than o¤ering any set of separating policies. A strategy involving a pooling
full coverage contract can be an equilibrium if the low risks probability of incurring an
accident, the di¤erences between the low risks and the high risks probabilities, as well
as the proportion of high risks within the entire population are all relatively low.
In fact, our conclusions show consistency with the ndings in Fluet (1992). Consider
a contract with a probationary period only. Then the monetary deductible is equal to
the loss during that period and zero thereafter. Apparently, in many cases this maximal
di¤erence between the deductibles does not work out very well for the individual. Fluet
has shown that any time-dependent monetary deductible for the low risks is always strictly
positive. This nding, however, requires that the hazard rates for the two types are clearly
ranked for all subperiods  which is more restrictive than our assumption of monotonic
behaviour of fH(t)
fL(t)
. It is interesting to note that, in case b (t) is constant so that FH (t) =
bFL (t), Fluet establishes that the monetary deductible for the low risks is constant over
time. This implies that the separating menu does not involve a time deductible. Fluet
only considers the case of Nash behavior in detail. However, he rightly points out in his
concluding remarks that the low risks will purchase the same type of contract if rms
behave with Wilson foresight.
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